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1962/11/08

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November 8, 1962

TO: ARA - Mr. Martin
 FROM: ARA - Robert A. Hurwitch
 SUBJECT: Actions Harmful to the Castro Regime

In response to your request for a list of actions that the US might initiate which would be harmful to the Castro regime and which at the same time would be unlikely to provoke a "shooting" response, there is attached such a list. This list covers the diplomatic-political, economic, psychological and other fields, including covert as well as overt actions, in support of specified policy objectives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 REVIEWED by *RA Hurwitz* DATE *3/18/88*
 () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
 () EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
 (X) DENY () Non-responsive info.
 FOIA, EO or PA exceptions *(S)*
 TS authority to: *CADR*
 () CLASSIFY as *TS*, CADR
 (X) DOWNGRADE TS to (X) S or () C, CADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 () RELEASE
 () EXCISE
 (X) DENY
 () DELETE Non-Responsive Info
 FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

TS authority to:
 () CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

Date: *4/1/88*

TS authority to:
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ARA:RAHurwitz:jb

~~SECRET, CADR~~~~TOP SECRET~~Date: *12/18/92*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(X) RELEASE (X) DECLASSIFY
 () EXCISE () DECLASSIFY
 () DENY IN PART
 () DELETE Non-Responsive Info
 FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
 EO Citations _____

TS authority to
 () CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

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Actions against the Castro regime should be focussed upon three areas: 1) the regime's stability in Cuba; 2) the regime's influence in the Hemisphere; and 3) the regime's relations with the Bloc. In these areas, we can 1) weaken the regime; 2) accelerate the regime's diminishing influence in the Hemisphere; and 3) increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime. Since these objectives are interrelated, the specific courses of action we might undertake to accomplish the objectives would have multiple effect.

1. Isolate Cuba from the Hemisphere by achieving:

- (a) a complete break in diplomatic relations between Latin American countries and Cuba,
- (b) a trade embargo (except foodstuffs and medicines) between the Hemisphere and Cuba,
- (c) the cessation of Latin-American shipping and air transport to Cuba,
- (d) the prohibition of the entry of pro-Castro literature into Latin American countries,
- (e) the jamming of Cuban broadcasts to the Hemisphere,
- (f) the prohibition of travel by Latin American nationals to Cuba through passport regulations,
- (g) the prohibition of travel by Cuban officials or pro-Castro Cubans to Latin American countries,
- (h) the extradition to Cuba from Latin American countries of pro-Castro Cuban nationals,
- (i) the exclusion of Prensa Latina from Latin American countries

Comment:

The above is excessively complete. Break in diplomatic, economic and transport relations would probably achieve most of what we mean by isolation as far as the Hemisphere is concerned.

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2. Weaken the regime by achieving:

- (a) Free World agreement to cease making shipping available available in the Bloc-Cuban trade,
- (b) Free World agreement to prohibit their airlines from servicing Cuba,
- (c) Free World agreement to limit trade with Cuba to foodstuffs and medicines (fall back to exclude spare parts and industrial equipment as a minimum),
- (d) minor acts of sabotage by the Cuban people,
- (e) sabotage of key installations (refineries, power plants, etc).
- (f) the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials and delegates abroad.
- (g) a constant flow of propaganda beamed at the Cuban people.

⑨ (h) the organization of internal resistance with a political base, through the provision of men, arms, money, sabotage and communications equipment,

- (i) the refusal of labor groups to handle cargo destined to or from Cuba,
- (j) sabotage of Cuban cargo and Cuban shipping destined to Free World,
- (k) a split within the regime
- (l) deep friction between Soviets in Cuba and Cubans.

3. Increase the burden of Cuba to the Bloc by achieving:

• (if most or all of the above courses of actions are accomplished the burden upon the Bloc will have been increased considerably)

- (a) sabotage of Bloc cargoes destined to Cuba and Cuban cargoes destined to the Bloc,
- (b) Free World agreement to prohibit Soviet overflights.
- (c) defections of Soviets in Cuba.

4. Split regime
DZ from Moscow ~~TOP SECRET~~

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